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Abstract
We analyze the computational complexity of the power measure in models of collec-
tive decision: the generalized opinion leader-follower model and the oblivious and
non-oblivious influence models. We show that computing the power measure is #P-
hard in all these models, and provide two subfamilies in which the power measure
can be computed in polynomial time.
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Opinion leadership is a well known and established model for communication
in sociology and marketing. It comes from the two-step flow of communica-
tion theory proposed in the 1940s [1]. This theory recognizes the existence
of collective decision-making situations in societies formed by actors called
opinion leaders.Following those ideas an opinion leader-follower model (OLF)
was introduced in [4] together with two measures associated to participants
satisfaction (Sat) and power (Pow). Cooperative influence games were intro-
duced in [3] based on how influence is exerted in the linear threshold model.
Decision models extending OLF to general influence graphs: generalized opin-
ion leader-follower model (gOLF), and oblivious and non-oblivious influence
decision models, were introduced in [2] together with an analysis of the com-
plexity of computing the Sat measure. Here we analyze the computational
complexity of the Pow measure showing that it presents the same behavior as
Sat: computing Pow is #P-hard, for the decision models considered in this
paper, while it can be computed in polynomial time in strong hierarchical and
star influence graphs.
2 Decision models
All the graphs considered in this paper are directed, without loops and mul-
tiple edges. We use standard notation: G = (V,E) is a directed graph, V (G)
denotes the vertex set, E(G) is the edge set, and n denotes the number of
vertices |V |. We use simply V and E when there is no risk of confusion. For
i ∈ V , SG(i) = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} denotes the set of successors of i, and
PG(i) = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E} the set of predecessors of i. A two layered
bipartite graph is a bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) with V (G) = V1 ∪ V2 and
E ⊆ V1 × V2, i.e., so that for i ∈ V1, PG(i) = ∅ and, for i ∈ V2, SG(i) = ∅. By
Ia, as usual, we denote a graph that is formed by a isolated vertices. Given
G = (V,E) and X ⊆ V , G[X] denotes the subgraph induced by X and G \X
denotes the subgraph induced by V \X, i.e., G\X = G[V \X]. For an acyclic
graph G, I denotes the set of vertices with PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) = ∅; L those
with PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅; F those with PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) = ∅; and
FI = F ∪ I. For a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, let X(x) = {i | xi = 1} and define x−i
as the vector that is x but changing the component xi by xi.
Definition 2.1 A decision model M is a tuple (V,D, q) where V = {1, . . . , n}
and D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a function, and 0 ≤ q ≤ n+1. For a participants’
initial decision vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, the final decision vector is y = D(x). The
associated collective decision function CM : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is defined as
CM(x) = 1 iff |{i ∈ V | yi = 1}| ≥ q.
Now we present the formal definition of opinion leader-follower models.
Definition 2.2 A generalized opinion leader-follower model (gOLF) is a de-
fined by a triple (G, r, q) where G = (V,E) is a two layered bipartite digraph
representing the actors’ relations, r is a rational number, 1/2 ≤ r ≤ 1, and q
is an integer, 0 < q ≤ n, defining a decision modelM(G, r, q) = (V (G), D, q).
The function D is defined as follows, for x ∈ {0, 1}n, let y = D(x), for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, if for one z ∈ {0, 1}, |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = z}| ≥ dr · |PG(i)|e and
|{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = 1− z}| < dr · |PG(i)|e, we set yi = z otherwise yi = xi.
An OLF, is a gOLF where n is odd and q = (n + 1)/2. An odd-OLF is
a gOLF M = (G, r, q) in which r = 1/2 and, for all i ∈ V with PG(i) 6= ∅,
|PG(i)| is odd.
Before defining influence based models, we recall the definitions of influence
graphs and spread of influence from [3]. An influence graph is a tuple (G, f),
where G = (V,E) is a directed graph and f is a labeling function assigning
to any vertex a non-negative rational value. Let (G, f) be an influence graph
and let X ⊆ V . The activation process, with initial activation X, at time t,
0 ≤ t ≤ n, activates a set of vertices F t(X) defined as follows: F 0(X) = X
and F t(X) = F t−1(X) ∪ {i ∈ V | |PG(i) ∩ F t−1(X)| ≥ f(i)}, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
The spread of influence of X in (G, f) is the set F (X) = F n(X).
Definition 2.3 An oblivious influence model is a decision model described
by (G, f, q,N), where (G, f, q,N) is an influence graph with positive labeling
function defining the model M(G, f, q,N) = (V (G), D, q) where , for x ∈
{0, 1}n, y = D(x) is defined as yi = 1 iff i ∈ F (X(x) ∩N).
A non-oblivious influence model is a decision model described by M =
(G, f, q,N) where (G, f, q,N) is an influence graph with positive labeling func-
tion defining the model (V (G), D, q) where y = D(x) is defined as follows. For
x ∈ {0, 1}n, let p1i (x) = |F (X(x)∩N)∩P (i)| and p0i (x) = |P (i)\F (X(x)∩N)|.
For i ∈ V (G) \ N , yi = 1 iff i ∈ F (X(x). For i ∈ N , if for one z ∈ {0, 1},
pzi (x) ≥ f(i) and pzi (x) < f(i), we set yi = z otherwise yi = xi.
In general, a gOLF cannot be cast as an oblivious influence model because
the tie-breaking rules are different. However odd-OLF constitute a submodel
of both oblivious and non-oblivious influence models as ties do not arise.
Now we define the power measure introduced in [4].
Definition 2.4 Let M = (V,D, q) be a decision model. The power of i ∈ V ,
PowM(i) is defined as |{x ∈ {0, 1}n | C(x) = xi ∧ C(x−i) = C(x)}|.
Associated with this measure we consider the Power problem: Given a
decision model M and an actor i compute PowM(i).
3 Complexity of computing Power
Let (G, f) be an influence graph, for i ∈ V (G). For N ⊆ V (G) and 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Fk(N,G, f) denotes the set {X ⊆ V (G) | |F (X ∩ N)| = k}. The Expansion
problem asks to compute |Fk(N,G, f)|, given an influence graph (G, f), N ⊆
V (G) and an integer k. The Expansion problem is known to be #P-hard for
odd-OLF taking N = L ∪ I [2].
Theorem 3.1 The Power problem is #P-hard for odd-OLF models.
Proof. [Sketch] To show hardness we provide a reduction from the Expansion
on odd-OLF. Let (G, f,N, k) be an input to the Expansion problem were
(G, f) is the graph corresponding to an odd-OLF (G, r) and N = L ∪ I.
Consider the odd-OLF (G′, r) where G′ is obtained from G by adding an
isolated new vertex z. Observe that (G′, r) is and odd-OLF with an additional
independent participant. It is easy to see that for M = M(G′, r, k + 1),
PowM(z) = |Fk(G, f,N)|. Using this fact as the construction can be computed
in polynomial time the results follows. 2
As an odd-OLF is a gOLF and also an oblivious and a non-oblivious in-
fluence model we get the following result.
Corollary 3.2 The Power problem for gOLF and oblivious and non-oblivious
influence models is #P-hard.
In the following we consider two subfamilies of bipartite digraphs, the
strong hierarchical and the star influence graphs introduced in [2]. We devise
polynomial time algorithms to solve Power for those families of graphs.
Strong hierarchical graphs are defined through some basic operations.
Given two graphs H1 and H2 with V (H1)∩ V (H2) = ∅ their disjoint union is
the graph H1 + H2 = (V (H1) ∪ V (H2), E(H1) ∪ E(H2)). Given a graph H,
the one layer extension to a set V ′ 6= ∅ of new vertices (V (H) ∩ V ′ = ∅) is
the graph H ⊗ V ′ is defines as V (H ⊗ V ′) = V (H) ∪ V ′ and E(H ⊗ V ′) =
E(H) ∪ {(u, v) | u ∈ FI(H), v ∈ V ′}.
Observe that we have L(H1 +H2) = L(H1)∪ L(H2), I(H1 +H2) = I(H1)∪
I(H2), F(H1 + H2) = F(H1) ∪ F(H2) and FI(H1 + H2) = FI(H1) ∪ FI(H2).
Furthermore, L(H ⊗ V ′) = L(H) ∪ I(H), I(H ⊗ V ′) = ∅, and F(H ⊗ V ′) =
FI(H ⊗ V ′) = V ′.
As base case we use graphs with only isolated vertices. The family is
completed by taking the closure under the two graph operations defined above.
Definition 3.3 The family of strong hierarchical graphs is defined recursively
as follows: (1) The graph Ia, for a > 0, is a strong hierarchical graph; (2)
if H1 and H2 are disjoint strong hierarchical graphs, the graph H1 + H2 is
a strong hierarchical graph; and (3) if H is a strong hierarchical graph and
V ′ 6= ∅ is a set of vertices with V (H) ∩ V ′ = ∅, the graph H ⊗ V ′ is a strong
hierarchical graph. A strong hierarchical influence graph is an influence graph
(G, f) where G is a strong hierarchical graph.
Theorem 3.4 The Power problem, for oblivious and non-oblivious influence
models corresponding to strong hierarchical influence graphs, is polynomial
time solvable.
Proof. [Sketch] Let M = M(V,D, q) be the oblivious or the non-oblivious
model corresponding to a strong hierarchical influence graph (G, f). Fix a
participant i. For x ∈ {0, 1}n let x′ = x−i, y = D(x) and y′ = D(x′).
Consider a table T (a, b, c, d), 0 ≤ a, c ≤ n and 0 ≤ b, d ≤ |FI(G)| holding the
following quantities
|{x ∈ {0, 1}n | |{j | D(x) = 1}| = a ∧ |F (X(x) ∩N) ∩ FI(H)| = b







T (a, b, c, d).
The values in the table T can be computed recursively, using the hierarchical
structure of G, from the tables corresponding to different subgraphs of G.
However, the recurrences are different for the oblivious than for the non-
oblivious model. Our algorithms use dynamic programming to compute the
table T in polynomial time. 2
In a star influence graph, in addition to the sets L, I and F, we have the
central node c wich acts as mediator and the set R of reciprocal actors.
Definition 3.5 A star influence graph is an influence graph (G, f), where
V (G) = L∪I∪R∪{c}∪F and E(G) = {(u, c) | u ∈ L∪R}∪{(c, v) | v ∈ R∪F}.
As usual in a star influence model, M(G, f, q,N), we take N = L ∪ R ∪ I.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the labeling function of a
star influence graph satisfies f(i) ∈ {0, 1}, for i ∈ V (G) \ {c}.
Theorem 3.6 The Power problem, for oblivious and non-oblivious models
corresponding to star influence games, is polynomial time solvable.
Proof. [Sketch] Let M = M(V,D, q) be the oblivious model corresponding
to a star influence influence graph (G, f) with center c. Fix a participant i.
For x ∈ {0, 1}n let x′ = x−i. In the oblivious model we know that when
p1c(x) ≥ k and p1c(x′) ≥ k or when p1c(x) < k and p1c(x′) < k CM(x) = CM(x′)
and thus i has no power to change the collective decision by changing its initial
decision. We analyze the case p1c(x) ≥ k and p1c(x′) < k depending on whether
i is a leader, a follower, c or a reciprocal actor. In all the cases we can provide
a characterization of the set of initial decision vectors in which player i has
the power to change the final decision according to its initial decision. Those
characterizations allows us to count the number of their elements and thus to
compute PowM(i). For the non-oblivious model the proof follows the same
lines, however we have to take into consideration further cases in particular
those in which c is convinced to change an initial 1 into a 0 which never
happens in the oblivious model. 2
Finally, we want to point out that the complexity of Satisfaction and
Power for OLF models remains open as well as the complexity of Expansion
for two layered bipartite graphs under the simple majority rule.
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